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ABSTRACT
Over time, organized religion has impacted many aspects of societies across the globe. In
this study, I focus on the island of Ireland – a clear case study with a history of sectarian
religious divides that play out in a democratic society. Through my analysis I find that religion
has operated quite differently on both sides of the Irish border as it relates to public opinion on
abortion, sexuality, and gender roles. Specifically, there are striking cross-national differences
regarding the importance of religious group identity compared to levels of personal religiosity in
shaping public opinion on the issues studied.
To examine the relationship between religious group, personal religiosity, and social
attitudes (including abortion rights, LGBTQ+ issues, and gender roles in family), I use
International Social Survey Programme Religion data from 1991 and 2008 to conduct bivariate
and multivariate statistical models. This analysis reveals three major trends. First, both religious
group identity and personal religiosity matter a great deal in Northern Ireland as it relates to
social attitudes. Additionally, over time the religiously unaffiliated in the North have emerged as
a cohesive and politically distinct group that organizes around liberal social and political values.
Lastly, in the Republic, personal religiosity is more influential than religious group identification
in determining social values on abortion, same-sex marriage, and gender roles. Subsequent
qualitative case studies suggest that modern-day rhetoric from religious elites, politicians, and
interest groups are still consistent with these cross-national trends decades later.
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Introduction
Throughout history, organized religion has maintained a strong influence over issues of
social and moral importance across the globe. My younger brother is the product of in vitro
fertilization and as a child I remember hearing about a devout Pentecostal man my father worked
with who told him taking creation out of God’s hands is a sin. In my view, in vitro fertilization
and abortion politics in the church are two sides of the same coin regarding women’s autonomy
in reproduction. Through this project, I hope to better understand the ways organized religion
and religious elite rhetoric impact individual views on women’s right to control their own
reproduction and the policy implications of these views in democratic societies. To study the
relationship between organized religion and gendered social politics, I focus on the island of
Ireland, which is a clear case study of sectarian, religious divides that play out in democratic
societies.
By seeking to better understand the impact that religious institutions can have on
women’s autonomy issues in cross-national contexts, this study will contribute to the larger
conversation surrounding the factors that shape public opinion on women’s rights. Most existing
research related to religious institutions in Ireland focuses strictly on either Catholicism or
Protestantism. Some researchers seek to understand how the political influence of the Church
and religious identity has changed over time in Ireland (Buckley, 2016; Inglis, 2007; Inglis,
2017); meanwhile, other scholars directly analyze the positions Irish religious institutions take on
abortion politics (Bloomer and Pierson 2017; Bloomer et al. 2019; Dillon 1996; Jelen and
Wilcox 2002). Still, other researchers compare the Irish national contexts to trends of abortion
politics in other Western nations (Jelen and Wilcox 1998; Randall 1992).
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No Irish-specific study explores the interplay between abortion and gender role attitudes
under the umbrella of gender equality, though Amy Adamczyk has explored this relationship in
an international context using World Values Survey data (Adamczyk, 2013). Another 1998 study
by Ted Jelen and Clyde Wilcox uses the World Values Survey to explore political socialization
among Catholics in Western Europe. They study the dissemination of “traditional Catholic
values”, including attitudes on abortion and (to a lesser extent) gendered family values (Jelen &
Wilcox, 1998). My thesis will build on this smaller body of research that views abortion and
gendered family roles as functions of a larger conversation of women’s equality and autonomy.
Additionally, few studies compare Catholic and Protestant opinions, even in intranational
Irish contexts. Mick Cunningham uses “Family and Changing Gender Roles” ISSP data to hone
in on Northern Irish attitudes on gender and family roles around the time of the Good Friday
agreement (Cunningham, 2017). My thesis is inspired, in part, by his comparison between
religious groups and will expand this framework of comparison to a larger Irish context by
including the Republic of Ireland in my cross-denominal analysis.
My thesis uniquely compares the religious contexts of Northern Ireland and the Republic
of Ireland using ISSP “Religion” data from 1991 and 2008, as well as modern day case studies to
think about old questions related to gender and religion. To explore the intersection of religion,
gender, and politics in Ireland, I will look at how religious group identity and personal religiosity
measures impact individual opinions on gendered social issues. These issues include abortion,
same sex relationships, and gender roles in marriage. I have chosen this set of issues because I
view them as related under the umbrella of gender politics and women’s autonomy, an area of
which “the Church” has a lot to say. This work is distinct to existing literature in that it accounts
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for all major religious groups on the island of Ireland, including the religiously unaffiliated,
while analyzing these groups in a cross-national context over time.
The next section will expand on the major religious groups present on both sides of the
Irish border and how these groups have changed over time. After this, I will provide an overview
of the legal frameworks regarding abortion access, same-sex marriage, and gender roles in
family on both sides of the border. Next, I will highlight three theories best supported by the
literature that seek to explain which aspect of religion is most impactful in shaping public
opinion. Then, I will detail my quantitative research methods and discuss the theories best
supported by my statistical analysis. Finally, I will expand on the major quantitative findings by
examining how religion has contributed to the most recent gendered policy debates on both sides
of the border.

Religious Landscapes
Overview
Religious identity is both a social and personal concept, especially in societies with
charged historical contexts around religion (Inglis, 2007, p. 119). Scholars have noted global
trends regarding the decline of Catholic religious affiliation and the rise of the religiously
unaffiliated as a demographic (Inglis, 2007; Buckley, 2016; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2018).
These trends are also evidenced in Northern Ireland and the Republic.
In his work, Tom Inglis lays out multiple plausible explanations for the decline in
affiliation with the Catholic Church, including “increase in liberal, individualist behavior
associated with sexuality, the media, and consumer capitalism in general” (2007, p. 191).
Further, David Buckley describes other reasons for this decline, such as the deteriorating
5

credibility of the Catholic Church amidst a history of sexual abuse scandals and cover ups
(Buckley, 2016, p. 62). Meanwhile, the religious landscapes in both the Republic of Ireland and
Northern Ireland are changing to accommodate increasing religious and ethnic diversity
(Buckley, 2016, p. 63-64).
Similarly, global trends regarding the religiously unaffiliated can be seen on both sides of
the Irish border. 1991 marked the first time an option to select “none” was included on the
religious demographics section of the Northern Ireland census. In that year, 11 percent of the
population chose either “None” or didn’t answer the religious demographic census question
(Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISO), 1991).

Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland has a Protestant plurality among its population, with 42% of
respondents to the 2011 Census identifying as “Protestant or Other Christian” (NISO, 2011). The
Protestant proportion of the population has shrunk over time; meanwhile, the Catholic population
has grown at a steady rate since the 1981 Census and now makes up a sizable population in the
North (Britannica, 2021). The last census in Northern Ireland took place in 2011, and another is
set to occur in 2021. News outlets, such as BBC, speculate that the next wave of census data may
show Catholics outnumbering Protestants in the province (Gordon, 2018). These demographic
changes could tip the political scale, as more Catholics tend to identify with left wing political
parties than Protestants (Cunningham, 2017). More importantly, under the Good Friday
Agreement, a majority vote could reunite Northern Ireland with the Republic (Education Service
Northern Ireland Assembly, 2021). Because of this provision, a Catholic majority could have
great political ramifications for the North.
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Many denominations make up the Northern Irish Protestant plurality (Inglis, 2007, p.
118). Specifically, Presbyterians are the largest denomination within the Protestant category in
Northern Ireland. Still, many others in the North are Anglican, with the Church of Ireland
serving as the largest Anglican Churches on both sides of the Irish border (Church of Ireland,
2021). The Northern Ireland Census has categorized the most prevalent Protestant denominations
differently over time. In 2001, Protestant categories were broken up into: “Presbyterian, Church
of Ireland, Methodist, and Other Christian”. Only 0.82 percent of respondents chose “other
religion or philosophy” in 2001 – up from 0.3% (or less than 5,100) of respondents in 2001
(NISO, 2001; NISO, 2011). It seems that, prior to 2001, “other denominations” served as a
blanket category for both “other” Christian and non-Christian denominations, making it difficult
to determine the prevalence of non-Christian populations in Northern Ireland prior to 2001
within Census data (NISO, 2021). Figure 1 provides a visual of the changes to the Protestant,
Catholic, and unaffiliated populations, according to four decades of Northern Ireland census
data.
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FIGURE 11

Republic of Ireland
There is much less religious diversity in the Republic of Ireland when compared to the
North. In the Republic, the vast majority of the population is Catholic (Inglis 2007, p. 118). In
2016, Catholics made up for nearly 80 percent of the total Irish population, which was down
about five percent from 2011 (Central Statistics Office, 2016). The Republic of Ireland’s Central
Statistics Office (CSO) indicates that the Catholic population in the Republic hit a peak of over
94 percent in the 1960’s. Since then, the Catholic population has slowly declined (Central
Statistics Office, 2016). In 2016, the CSO report indicates that the religiously unaffiliated
population grew by nearly 200,000 persons, making it the second largest religious group.

1

Data from Census Reports (1981-2011). Retrieved from Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency.
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Protestants are mostly concentrated in the Church of Ireland or Presbyterian Church and
make up less than five percent of the Republic according to the 2016 Census (Central Statistics
Office, 2016). While Protestants are categorized by denomination, personal religiosity is the
main point of diversity within the Catholic population. Inglis expands on this point in his work
by discussing the prevalence of individuals who identify with a religious group while their
religious behaviours and practices remain nominal (Inglis, 2007, p. 117).
The Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference notes that, while survey measures of religiosity
are highly debated, great variance can be seen within the English Values Study data regarding
levels of religiosity among Catholics. In their report, they analyze survey data from the fourth
wave, which took place in 2008 (O’Mahony, 2010, p. 2). In their data analysis, the Council for
Research and Development notes that the proportion of Catholics on the Island attending Mass
weekly or more has fallen over time, from over 80 percent in the 1970’s to less than half of the
Catholic population at the time of the 2010 report (O’Mahony, 2010, p. 5). The report also finds
that Northern Irish Catholics attend church more often than those in the Republic (O’Mahony,
2010, p. ). This report, derived from English Values Study data, signifies the existence of
nominal Catholics who identify with the religion but do not practice conventional indicators of
their faith on a regular basis (such as attending Mass and praying regularly).

The Legal Framework
This section will provide an overview of the relevant policy background in both Northern
Ireland and the Republic on abortion, LBGTQ+ issues, and issues related to gender roles in the
law. Religious groups in Ireland have mobilized on each issue at different points in time, as each
topic relates to the traditional social values often held by Protestants and Catholics alike. In their
9

piece, Smyth links sexuality and reproductive freedom under the same moral umbrella, which
play out in nationalist politics and discourse (Smyth, 2006, p. 654). In debates surrounding
abortion, LGBT+ rights, and gender roles, churches have played a role in shaping public opinion
as well as the policy landscape (Smyth, 2006).
In short, political changes in Northern Ireland around abortion and LGBTQ+ issues have
progressed in recent years; however these legal changes have stemmed from legislation passed in
the United Kingdom as opposed to the Northern Irish Assembly. On the other hand, Northern
Ireland has enjoyed less progress relating to gender roles in family. In fact, Brexit has caused
substantial anxiety regarding the potential for regression on issues such as equal pay and nondiscrimination measures for pregnant individuals which are protected under European Union
measures. Meanwhile, changes to abortion and same-sex marriage in the Republic of Ireland
have been achieved through multiple referendums to amend the Constitution. Despite these more
direct and fundamental constitutional changes on abortion and LGBTQ+ issues, the Republic has
also experienced slower progress as it relates to gender roles in family.

An Overview of Abortion Policy
Northern Ireland
Early Policy
Prior to 2019, abortion was heavily restricted in Northern Ireland in ways unique from
the rest of the United Kingdom, as key pieces of abortion legislation reform in the U.K. did not
apply to Northern Ireland.2 The key basis for Northern Ireland’s abortion laws was Sections 58

2

Conservative unionists were adamant in every other regard that Northern Ireland be treated no differently than the
rest of the United Kingdom; however, when it came to abortion policy, unionists advocated against adopting
liberalized abortion policy from the UK.
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and 59 of the 1861 Offences Against The Person Act. Section 58 made “attempts to procure an
abortion” a felony; meanwhile, Section 59 classifies any attempt to aid a woman seeking an
abortion or intentional miscarriage as a misdemeanor (UK Parliament, 1861). The Offences
Against The Person Act left no room for exceptions or exemptions related to cases of rape,
incest, or medical necessity.
In 1967, England, Scotland, and Wales amended their abortion laws through the Abortion
Act 1967 to provide for circumstances in which a legal abortion could be obtained. The 1967
provisions for legal abortions include risk to the pregnant woman’s mental and physical health as
well as risk that the child would be born with significant disabilities (UK Parliament, 1967). The
Abortion Act 1967 did not apply to Northern Ireland, and so abortions remained illegal in the
province; however, many women from Northern Ireland traveled to England, Scotland, and
Wales to access abortion services prior to the decriminalization of abortion in 2019 (Boyle &
McEvoy, p. 283).

Decriminalization of Abortion
In October 2019, the UK Parliament decriminalized abortion in Northern Ireland with the
passage of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc.) Act (Rough, 2020; UK Parliament,
2019). Though abortion was decriminalized in Northern Ireland, it is important to note that this
did not take place through the Northern Irish Assembly. Instead, this Act was an action from the
Parliament of the United Kingdom that provided deadlines related to the formation of a Northern
Irish Executive after the Assembly collapsed in 2017 (Torrance, 2019). If no executive was put
into place by October 21, 2019, the Act would automatically go into effect the following day
(Rough, 2020).
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No Northern Irish executive was formed by the deadline and so abortion was
decriminalized by the Act on October 22, 2019 (Rough, 2020; UK Parliament, 2019).
Specifically, Section 9 of the Northern Ireland Act repealed sections 58 and 59 of the Offences
Against the Person Act, which had made procuring an abortion a felony in Northern Ireland since
its passage in 1861 (UK Parliament, 1861; UK Parliament, 2019). The 2019 abortion regulations
were later repackaged due to drafting errors and passed again as “Abortion (Northern Ireland)
(No. 2) Regulations 2020” in June 2020, resulting in minor technical changes (Rough, 2020).
The Executive Formation Bill is responsible for other social change in Northern Ireland, such as
the legalization of same-sex marriage, which will be expanded on in “An Overview of LGBTQ+
Policy: Northern Ireland”.

Republic of Ireland
Early Policy
Section 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861 also provided the
original basis for abortion laws in the Republic of Ireland. Though this Act was passed well
before the Republic of Ireland was declared independent from the U.K. in 1919, it was one of
many U.K. laws that persisted in the Republic of Ireland after gaining independence (Burrell &
Griffiths, 2017); however, unlike Northern Ireland, most legal changes regarding abortion in the
Republic of Ireland have taken place via referendums on constitutional amendments.
The laws surrounding abortion in the Republic of Ireland remained unchanged until the 8

th

Amendment Referendum which passed with a two-thirds majority vote in 1983 (Gilmartin &
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White, 2001, p. 276).3 This amendment legally established an equal “right to life” for both
mother and child and treats any fetus as a person under law (De Londras & Máiréad, 2018, pg. 2;
Hillard, 2016; Nugent, 2018). De Londras, Máiréad, and other scholars discuss the 1983 8th
Amendment referendum as a movement influenced by conservative and religious forces in
response to women’s liberation movements around the world. Notably, both the United States
and the United Kingdom liberalized their abortion laws during the 1960’s and 70’s via Roe v.
Wade and the Abortion Act of 1967 respectively (De Londras & Máiréad, 2018, pg. 3; Nugent,
2018).

Abortion Tourism & The X Case
Just like in Northern Ireland, there were many documented cases of women traveling
from the Republic to the United Kingdom to receive abortions prior to the liberalization of
abortions laws (Barry, 1998; Lentin, 2013, p. 132). Gilmartin and White refer to this trend as
“abortion tourism” (pg. 276); meanwhile, Lentin estimates that over 150,000 women with
addresses in the Republic of Ireland traveled to Britain to access abortion services between 1980
and 2011 (Lentin, 2013, p. 132).
One of the most famous examples of “abortion tourism” in the Republic of Ireland was
“The X Case”, which was tried before the Irish Supreme Court in 1992 (Gilmartin & White,
2001; Lentin, 2013, p. 132). The case centered around a 14-year old girl who was impregnated
by her rapist and was prevented from traveling to Britain for an abortion, despite a significant
risk of suicide. The Supreme Court ruled in the girl’s favor, recognizing the risk a forced

3

Because the 8th Amendment was passed, it necessitated that future changes to abortion policy would have to come
through a constitutional amendment. Some scholars posit that this was a strategic move by the pro-life movement in
the Republic to make it more difficult to change abortion laws (Carnegie & Roth, 2019).
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pregnancy posed to her mental health. This precedent established the right to travel for abortion
access (Gilmartin & White, 2001, p. 277; Lentin, 2013, p. 132). The Court again upheld this
precedent in 2007 when the “D Case” came before the Court, with similar facts regarding a
seventeen-year-old’s right to travel for an abortion (Gilmartin & White, 2001, p. 277).
The right to travel, or “abortion tourism”, became a specific inflection point in the
discourse surrounding abortion access in Ireland, leading to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution Acts in 1992. The Thirteenth Amendment Act changes the
Eighth Amendment, also referred to as Article 40.3 of the Constitution, to clarify and reinforce
the freedom to engage in interstate travel for abortion access (Ireland, 1945). Meanwhile, the
Fourteenth Amendment Act of 1992 amends Article 40.3, protects the right to obtain information
about legal abortion services available in another state (House of the Oireachtas, 1992).4
Though the right to travel for an abortion is guaranteed by the Irish Constitution,
Gilmartin and White rightfully critique the equitability of this option. While all Irish women
have the right to travel to receive an abortion, this “solution” is unattainable for those without the
socioeconomic means to afford substantial expenses associated with travel. Further, race and
nationality prevent other women from accessing safe and legal abortion via travel due to
complicated laws and visa processes (Gilmartin & White, 2001, pg. 278). Without equitable,
safe, and legal access to abortion, women who are marginalized on the basis of class, nationality,
or race are more likely to pursue dangerous alternatives.

4

Notably, the passage of the 15th Amendment happened around the same time, which legalized divorce in the
Republic. Many of the same groups mobilized against the passage of this Amendment (for more information, see
Barry, 1998).
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Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act
Despite the vast political mobilization around abortion access in the 1990’s, little
legislative change occurred for two decades. The issue of abortion access was brought back to
the forefront of Irish politics with the wrongful death of Savita Halappanavar in
2012. Halappanavar was a migrant woman who sought medical attention for a miscarriage in
Galway at seventeen weeks of pregnancy. Though it was clear she would die due to her medical
complications, she was repeatedly denied termination of her pregnancy because Ireland is a
“Catholic country” and a fetal heartbeat was still detectable (Lentin, 2013, p. 130). Ronit Lentin
describes the intersectionality of this tragedy best by saying, “beyond being a woman who
unnecessarily died in childbirth in Ireland’s post-Catholic patriarchy, Halappanavar was a
migrant woman, whose death requires theorizing the Republic of Ireland as a gendered racial
state” (Lentin, 2013, p. 130).
Savita’s entirely avoidable and wrongful death demonstrated yet again the serious
consequences of Ireland’s regressive abortion policies. Less than a year later, the Protection of
Life During Pregnancy Act (PLDPA) was passed to allow for termination of pregnancy if
multiple doctors agreed it was necessary to protect the mother’s life, including risk of suicide;
however, the Act did not make additional exceptions for “rape, incest or fatal fetal
abnormalities” (Burrell & Griffiths, 2017; Carnegie & Roth, 2019).
The PLPDA was largely ineffective and, according to the Irish Department of Health,
less than thirty abortions have been carried out under the parameters of the act per year since its
passage (Carnegie & Roth, 2019, p. 112). Multiple United Nations committees took issue with
these small changes to Ireland’s abortion policies. Most notably, The UN Committee on
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights indicated possible human rights violations in the Republic
and called for the repeal of the Eighth Amendment in 2015 (Hillard, 2016).

Repealing the 8th Amendment
In 2016, the Oireachtas, or the legislature of Ireland, voted to create an impartial
Citizen’s Assembly to discuss a range of issues including the Eighth Amendment (Carnegie &
Roth, 2019, p. 113). Interests groups participated heavily in the discourse around the Eighth
Amendment, including the Abortion Rights Campaign (ARC). The ARC helped provide firsthand narratives of women who had been harmed by Ireland’s regressive abortion policies.
Despite skepticism among some pro-choice groups, the Citizen’s Assembly sided with change
and urged for a referendum on the Eighth Amendment (Carnegie & Roth, 2019, p. 114). In May,
2018, the Eighth Amendment was repealed by a 2-to-1 vote and the new legislation was signed
by the President in December, 2018 (Carnegie & Roth, 2019, p. 115).
Today, abortion is available and free in Ireland during the first trimester of pregnancy
(Carnegie & Roth, 2019, p. 116); however, Carnegie and Roth note that abortion is still
criminalized by Irish law. The new legislation merely identifies acceptable instances in which an
exception can be granted (Carnegie & Roth, 2019, p. 117). The authors worry that this
“criminalization framework” unnecessarily burdens women seeking abortions, as well as
healthcare providers, and opens the door for anti-choice movements to interfere with a woman’s
right to terminate a pregnancy.5

5

Irish legislation exclusively uses “Termination of Pregnancy” to refer to abortion services; however, throughout
this piece, I use those terms interchangeably.
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An Overview of LGBTQ+ Policy
Northern Ireland
Though the 1998 Northern Ireland Agreement included specific language regarding the
promotion of “equality of opportunity” related to identity factors including sexuality, progress
has been slow for the LGBT community in Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Office, 1998, p.
20). In 1967, private homosexual acts among adults were decriminalized in England and Wales
via the Sexual Offences Act; Meanwhile, Northern Ireland did not change their laws to match
until fifteen years later (UK Parliament, 2021). Livingston posits that this slow progress was due
in part to Northern Ireland’s preoccupation with political and religious cleavages taking place at
the time (Livingston, 2003, p. 1210). Northern Ireland’s history of conflict resulted in a postagreement fixation with national and religious identity that made progress for other identity
groups, such as LGBTQ+ individuals, a low priority issue for many leaders (Livingston, 2003).
Still, numerous groups mobilized around equality for Northern Ireland’s LGBTQ+
community before and after the Troubles (Livingston, 2003). The Northern Ireland Gay Rights
Association was formed in 1975, and began petitioning for the repeal of the Offences Against the
Person Act of 1861 as well as the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1855 (Livingston, 2003, p.
1215). Both Acts criminalized homosexual activity until gay sex was legalized by the European
Court of Human Rights in 1981 (Livingston, 2003; Savage, 2019).6 After the decriminalization
of gay sexual intimacy, the next policy push focused on civil partnerships and same-sex
marriage.
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 was passed by the UK Parliament and made applicable to
Northern Ireland through Part 4 of the Act (UK Parliament, 2004). This Act allowed for the legal

6

Notably, gay sex was decriminalized in the rest of the United Kingdom over a decade prior (Savage, 2019).
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recognition of same-sex partnerships. Interestingly, Part 4 of the Act bars religious services from
being used during the officiating of a civil partnership (UK Parliament, 2004). This Act marked
great progress for LGBT rights; however marriage equality remained the ultimate goal.
Initially, no Northern Irish political party supported same-sex marriage; however, Sinn
Fein, Northern Ireland’s left wing revolutionist party, incorporated marriage equality as a policy
platform beginning in 2012. The party also introduced a motion to the Northern Ireland
Assembly to legalize same-sex marriage that same year (Savage, 2019). 7 The incorporation of
same-sex marriage in the Sinn Fein platform was a big step for the LGBTQ+ movement in the
North. On the other hand, the Democratic Unionist Party has stood firmly against the legalization
of same-sex marriage. Notably the Democratic Unionist Party was founded by Ian Paisley Sr. in
1971, the same man who founded the Free Presbyterian Church decades earlier (Savage, 2019).8
Between 2012 and 2015, the Northern Ireland Assembly voted on same-sex marriage five
times. On the fifth vote, a majority was reached in favor of the measure; however, the
Democratic Unionist Party vetoed it via a “petition of concern” (BBC News, 2015). The House
of Commons Library Briefing Paper on marriage of same sex couples in Northern Ireland notes
that multiple bills were proposed after the measure was blocked by the DUP in 2015; however,
no real progress was made until the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act passed in
Westminster in 2019 (Fairbairn, 2020).
This legislation essentially forced Northern Ireland’s hand on multiple issues, including
abortion rights and same-sex marriage equality. Ian Paisley Jr. spoke out against the Bill and
many other legislators took issue with such legislation coming from Westminster, as opposed to

7

The incorporation of this platform also contributed to the longstanding tension between Sinn Fein and the Catholic
Church (Sinn Fein, 2014; Savage, 2019).
8
Ironically, the Democratic Unionist Party and Free Presbyterian Church clashed in 2019 over the party’s selection
of an openly gay candidate, Alison Bennington (Manley, 2019).
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the Northern Irish Assembly (Fairbairn, 2020). Nonetheless, the bill was passed and no Northern
Irish executive was formed by the deadline set (Fairbairn, 2020; Torrance, 2019). As a result, the
Executive Formation Act went into effect on October 22, 2019. Section 8 of the Act required
Northern Ireland’s Secretary of State to make changes to allow for legal same-sex marriage “on
or before 13 January 2020” (Fairbairn, 2020, p. 3); thus, same-sex marriage has been legal in
Northern Ireland for over a year at this point in time.

Ireland
While the Republic of Ireland took longer to decriminalize gay sex than Northern Ireland,
marriage equality in the Republic occurred years prior to the change in the North. The Republic
of Ireland criminalized homosexual sodomy until 1993 and same-sex relationships were not
legally recognized until the passage of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations
of Cohabitants Acts in 2010 (Dunne, 2015, p. 77). Still, civil partnerships differed from marriage
in many important ways. Most notably, same-sex partners were not able to adopt children
together, only separately (Dunne, 2015). Even after policies surrounding same-sex relationships
liberalized in the 2010’s, employment legislation from earlier eras persist, allowing LGBT
individuals to be discriminated against if medical or employment institutions disagree with their
identity on a religious basis (Dunne, 2015).
In 2015, Ireland made history as the first country to adopt same-sex marriage equality by
referendum (Caollaí & Hilliard, 2015). The referendum came as a result of the Irish
Constitutional Convention, which met many times between 2013 and 2014 to discuss a myriad of
issues facing Ireland (The Convention on the Constitution, 2014). Same-sex marriage was one of
many topics discussed at the Convention. In their final report, the members of the Convention
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recommended a constitutional amendment to provide for same-sex marriage equality (The
Convention on the Constitution, 2014).
This referendum took place on May 22, 2015 and passed with 62.1% of voters supporting
the measure (Amnesty International UK, 2015). The thirty-fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, otherwise known as The Marriage Act of 2015, followed the referendum and made
the will of the people law. Section 4 of The Marriage Act 2015 amended the Civil Registration
Act of 2004, which prohibited same-sex partners to marry (House of the Oireachtas, 2015). The
Marriage Act also includes provisions protecting religious institutions from having to officiate
marriage ceremonies to which they don’t agree (McGee, 2015).

An Overview of Gender Roles in Law
Northern Ireland
In Northern Ireland, women still face significant legal barriers to true equality in society.
According to the Women’s Resource and Development Agency, most of these legal barriers
reside in the area of women’s employment and gender pay equity (Powell, 2020). This trend is
additionally evidenced by the Economic Justice Pillar of the Northern Ireland Women’s
Manifesto, drafted by international partners who make up the Women’s Policy Group (WPG)
(WPG, 2019). According to the Women’s Resource and Development Agency (WRDA), the
labour-markets in Northern Ireland are still highly segregated by gender (Powell, 2020). This
gender segregation is harmful to women’s equality because it reinforces the notion that women
should be doing certain kinds of labour – typically low paying service and hospitality positions
involving significant emotional labor (Powell, 2020). Additionally, this gender sorting says a lot
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about the inherent value of women in Northern Irish society, and is an indication of deeper
gender disparity present in the province.
The WRDA and WPG alike express concern over the risks to women’s rights associated
with Brexit, as many rights enjoyed by women in Northern Ireland are a result of European
Union policies, including measures such as equal pay, protections against discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy (Powell, 2020; WPG, 2019). One particular area for improvement in
Northern Irish law is in the issue of parental leave (WPG, 2019). As of now, parental leave
consists of eighteen weeks of unpaid leave for each eligible child (Labour Relations Agency,
2019). This framework is consistent with the measures set forth by the UK, but insufficient to
support women’s progress in the workplace and the broader society (Government Digital
Service, 2015; WPG, 2019).
Ireland
In their final report in 2014, the Constitutional Convention included a recommendation to
amend Article 41.2 of the Irish Constitution. Article 41.2 reads,
“ (1) In particular, the States recognises that by her life within the home, woman
gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved.
(2) The State shall, therefore, endeavor to ensure that mothers shall not be
obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in
the home.” (Ireland, 1945).
After meeting for multiple years to discuss problems facing the Republic of Ireland, the
Constitutional Convention recommended that “Article 41.2 should be made gender-neutral to
include other careers both ‘in the home’ and ‘beyond the home’ (Convention on the Constitution,
2014, Appendix D).9 Further, the convention recommended additional amendments to make

9

The Constitutional Convention met to review pressing issues in the Republic of Ireland and suggest changes or
areas for concern. Unlike in the American context, the members of the Convention were not empowered to draft a
constitution, or even amend the document themselves.

21

constitutional language gender inclusive and provide explicit language on gender equality
(Convention on the Constitution, 2014, Appendix D). The Irish government established task
forces on these issues in 2014; however, little progress has been made since its adoption.
In 2018, the Irish Human Rights and Equity Commission issued a report recommending
changes to Article 41.2. In the report, IHREC cites previous proposals on Article 41.2, including
the Convention’s work and the subsequent task force (Irish Human Rights and Equality
Commission, 2018). A referendum on removing Article 41.2 from the Constitution was supposed
to take place on October 26, 2018; however, the Oireachtas Justice and Equality Committee
opted to continue “pre-legislative scrutiny”, which pushed back the timeline (Department of
Justice, 2018; McMorrow, 2018). Most recently, the matter has been referred to the Citizen’s
Assembly. In 2020, a majority of the Assembly noted their support for the article’s deletion,
though the article remains unchanged in 2021 (Irish Legal News, 2020).

Theoretical Framework
Political issues related to gender, such as sexuality, abortion, contraception, divorce,
family, and gender roles are all matters of social traditionalism to which various organized
religious groups have weighed in on at various points in time. Organized religion has the
capacity to influence perceptions on these issues at both the individual and societal level
(Bloomer et al., 2019, p. 51). Particularly, I will focus on how Protestant and Catholic religious
organizations have weighed in on the issues of reproductive freedom, same-sex relationships,
and gender roles.
No one denomination has a monopoly on these issues. Catholic and Protestant groups
have lobbied, both separately and together, regarding gendered political issues (Bloomer et al,
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2019, p. 60). Abortion has been a continued topic of particular salience for both groups in recent
history. Authors like Vicky Randall attribute the historical salience of abortion in the secular and
religious realms to the rise of second wave feminism in the 1960’s and 70’s (Randall, 1992, p.
112). Governments maintained regressive, strict abortion restrictions, often supported by
religious institutions and interest groups. As religious groups mobilized in support of abortion
bans, secular and feminist groups would push back in opposition (Randall, 1992). This push and
pull between religious and secular groups on opposite sides of gendered issues has persisted to
today’s political climate.
The literature around Irish religious and national identity is nuanced and suggests
multiple distinct, and somewhat conflicting, views as to how religious identity operates on both
sides of the Irish border. My analysis will shed light on which frameworks are apparent on each
side of the Irish border and how they impact personal opinions on social policy. Here, I will
expand on each theory as it is supported by the literature. This section closes with an overview of
these theories and how they may be evidenced in my analysis.
Countermobilization Theory
The countermobilization theory is most strongly supported by the 1993 piece by Jelen,
O’Donnell, and Wilcox which studies abortion attitudes in Western Europe. Their piece suggests
the presence of a countermobilization effect, especially as it relates to religious minority
mobilization in Catholic-majority countries (Jelen, et al., 1993). This piece posits that, while the
Catholic church is effective in socializing Catholics to a pro-life stance, this effectiveness
motivates a countermobilization of pro-choice, non-Catholics (Jelen, et al., 1993, p. 380). In their
study, the respondents most sympathetic to abortion rights were non-Catholics living in Catholicmajority countries (p. 381). Further analysis suggests that this countermobilization may also
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operationalize in the other direction, with Catholic respondents in Protestant-majority countries
providing the most conservative, pro-life responses (p. 381). According to the
countermobilization theory, it matters most whether an individual is a member of the majority or
minority religious group in their country. If the countermobilization theory is present in this
context, it would likely be most evident amongst the Protestant minority in the Republic of
Ireland.

Ethno-Religious Theory
The ethno-religious theory refers to the idea that religious group identification is the most
determinative factor of social and political beliefs. A prime example of this ethno-religious
model can be seen in the American context. In their book, Wald and Calhoun-Brown discuss the
political cohesion present within the Black Church and the Jewish community. For these groups,
their religious identity has political meaning. The authors note that these groups are both
religiously and politically distinct, as Jewish individuals and members of the Black Church tend
to support the Democratic Party (Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2018).
If the ethno-religious theory is universally applicable and religious identity is always the
most salient indicator, national contexts shouldn’t matter. On the other hand, it is possible that
this theory is not equally applicable to all societies. It may be that religious group identity
matters greatly in divided societies, such as Northern Ireland, due to the history of social and
political ramifications of religious group identity.
There is some evidence to support the idea that ethno-religious patterns are particularly
relevant in the Northern Irish context. In his 2007 piece, Tom Inglis notes that religious identity
is particularly salient in Northern Ireland due to the history of religious conflict in the country
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(Inglis, 2007). Further, Claire Mitchell discusses the social and psychological impact religious
group identity can have, particularly in the Northern Irish context (Mitchell, 2005). Specifically,
Protestant and Catholic divisions in Northern Ireland have exhibited notable impacts on
employment, housing, and education to name a few areas (Mitchell, 2005). In addition, Mitchell
says, “Protestant and Catholic identifications in Northern Ireland still matter to one’s life chances
and place in society” (Mitchell, 2005, p. 5). The author goes on to discuss the importance of
religious group identity in the Northern Irish political arena. My data analysis will use survey
data from both sides of the Irish border to determine whether there is support for the ethnoreligious model and, if so, where it is most salient.

Religiosity Theory
According to the religiosity theory, how religiously devout an individual is matters more
than what religious group they are a part of. There is both a private and social aspect of
religiosity. It could be that a person’s private religious practices are most impactful, such as daily
prayer. Alternatively, the frequency of a person’s church attendance might be more
determinative of their social values. Additionally, individual beliefs about the Bible may help
determine attitudes on gendered topics, as those who believe in biblical literalism may be more
legalistic on social issues. Even still, each measure may play its own role in the ultimate
formation of social attitudes. If the religiosity theory holds true, it means that there is more
diversity within religious identity groups than between people of different religious traditions.
For example, in the context of this study, the religiosity theory would indicate that there are more
significant differences between the social beliefs of devout and nominal Catholics than between
a devout Catholic and a devout Protestant.
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It is important to note that there is significant debate among scholars as to which
measures of religiosity matter most, particularly as it relates to survey questions. In the 1960’s,
Glock and Stark put forth a multidimensional framework of religiosity that still impacts the study
of religion to this day (Clayton & Gladden, 1974). In that framework, Glock and Stark posit that
there are five main dimensions to religiosity, including belief, knowledge, religious rituals,
personal religious experiences, and secular consequences of belief (Clayton & Gladden, 1974).
Since then, researchers have tried to operationalize this framework through the creation of survey
questions honing in on these various dimensions of religiosity; however, no one group of
indicators are universally accepted. According to McAndrew and Voas, “it has become
conventional to focus on three aspects of religious involvement: belief, practice, and affiliation”
(McAndrew & Voas, 2011, p. 3). Still, well-respected institutions like the Pew Research Center
use measures including “affiliation, importance of religion, worship attendance, and frequency of
prayer” (Pew, 2018).
McAndrew and Voas note an important limitation of survey responses related to
religiosity – Americans tend to overreport religious attendance in surveys when they are asked
how often they attend (Hawaway & Marler, 1992; McAndrew & Voas, 2011, p. 5); however, this
trend runs the opposite way in countries like France (Brenner, 2011, p. 35). Existing literature
does not uncover which way this trend runs in the Irish context. McAndrew and Voas also note
sensitivity to question wording as a challenge for those interested in studying religiosity, as the
way a question is worded may significantly change the answer a respondent provides. They note
that the International Social Survey Program is attractive to this point because they maintain a
great deal of consistency in question wording related to religiosity over time (McAndrew &
Voas, 2011, p. 11). Multivariate analysis will uncover which measures of religiosity significantly
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impact views on abortion, same-sex marriage, and gender roles on both sides of the border when
all other variables are controlled for.

Theories of religion and political socialization
Countermobilization Theory
Definition: Political success of a religious minority motivates countermobilization of religious
minorities with differing opinions (Jelen, et al., 1993).
Example: The success of pro-life Catholics spurs the mobilization of pro-choice Protestants.
If this theory is present in the Irish context, I expect to find the strongest evidence in the
Republic of Ireland between the Catholic majority and Protestant minority.
Ethno-religious Theory
Definition: Religious group identification is the most determinative factor of social and
political beliefs (Inglis, 2007; Mitchell, 2005).
Example: In the American context, Jewish voters tend to support the Democratic Party.
If this theory is present in the Irish context, I expect to find strong sectarian differences
between Protestants and Catholics on the issues studied.
Religiosity Theory
Definition: How religiously devout an individual is matters more than what religious group
they are a part of (Clayton & Gladden, 1974; McAndrew & Voas, 2011).
Example: There are significant differences in the opinion of a Sunday School teacher and
someone who only attends church on religious holidays.
If this theory is present in the Irish context, I expect to find strong, statistically significant
results for each measure of personal religiosity on each dependent variable.
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Data, Variables, and Methods
The quantitative portion of this study is based on International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP) data from 1991 and 2008.10 The ISSP conducts a survey yearly which is distributed crossnationally. The ISSP repeats some surveys over time to follow trends in social values, including
topics like the environment, gender roles and family, and religion. The Religion ISSP survey was
conducted in 1991, 1998, 2008, and 2018; however, Northern Ireland was not included in the
2018 wave of the survey. In this quantitative analysis, I use data from the 1991 and 2008 survey
waves, as they represent the oldest and newest religion data available from ISSP on both sides of
the Irish border.
The two main categories of independent variables in this analysis are religious group
identity and personal religiosity. In each wave of the survey, respondents were asked to identify
their religious identity group. To best represent the Irish context, I created dummy variables for
Catholics, Protestants, and those with “No Religion”. Though the denominational categories
available in each wave of the survey are somewhat unique, the Protestant category encompasses
denominations such as Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, and those who identify themselves as
“other Christian”. The “No Religion” category, also referred to as the religiously unaffiliated,
only include individuals who indicated their religious group as “None”. The inclusion of “none”
as a religious group category is consistent with the operationalization of religious unaffiliation in
recent social science research on religion and politics (Wald & Calhoun Brown, 2018, p. 26).
I have chosen three independent variables related to personal religiosity, including
frequency of church attendance, self-reported religiosity, and beliefs about authorship of the

10

The ISSP data and survey mechanisms used in this study can be found at http://w.issp.org/data-download/bytopic/ under the Religion section.
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Bible. These particular variables were chosen to encompass the competing views regarding
measures of personal religiosity discussed above. Some believe socially based indicators of
religiosity matter more, such as church attendance. Meanwhile, others believe what individuals
do on their own time is more indicative of their true religiosity, such as their personal beliefs
about the Bible and how often they pray.
In this analysis, I use church attendance to encompass the social aspect of personal
religiosity. On the other hand, self-reported religiosity and feelings about the Bible highlight the
second, more individualistic, mode of religiosity. Self-reported religiosity is measured on a
seven-point scale from extremely religious to extremely non-religious (see Appendix 1 for full
wording of questions used). Additionally, related to their feelings about the Bible, respondents
are asked whether they believe the Bible is the actual word of God, the inspired word of God, or
an ancient book of fables.11 These responses indicate the level of biblical literalism exhibited by
the respondent.
The distinction between individual and social aspects of religiosity became apparent early
in this study. Initially, I intended to create a religiosity index of two questions including how
often a respondent prays and how often they attend church. Interestingly, in each wave of the
survey data, the alpha for these questions was not high enough to support the creation of an
index. In my view, this inability to create a religiosity index implies that the scholarly debate
regarding indicators of personal religiosity is particularly relevant to this case study. I hope that
my analysis will shed light on which metrics of personal religiosity are most impactful in the
Irish context.

11

The question regarding Biblical literalism was not asked in Northern Ireland in 2008.
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Additionally, this project revolves around three dependent variables, including attitudes
on abortion, same-sex relationships, and gender roles in the family. To study attitudes regarding
abortion access, two questions are indexed. The first abortion question revolves around access to
abortion in the interest of maternal health; meanwhile, a second question focuses on abortion
access due to financial necessity.12 In 2018, the alpha for the abortion index in Northern Ireland
was 0.739 and 0.809 in Ireland. In 1991, the alpha in Northern Ireland was 0.697 and 0.793 in
Ireland. In each year, the abortion questions are asked on a six-point scale. Responses include:
almost always wrong, always wrong, wrong only sometimes, not wrong at all, can’t choose, and
no answer. For the purposes of this analysis, responses of “can’t choose” and “no answer” are
coded as missing data. Thus, the abortion index is measured on a scale of 2-8, with lower values
indicating more conservative responses and vice versa.
To study attitudes on same-sex relationships, I use identical questions from the 1991 and
2008 waves of the survey, which ask respondents to report on a four-point scale the degree to
which they believe sexual relations between two people of the same sex are wrong or not wrong
(see Appendix 1 for question wording). Additionally, to measure attitudes about gender roles, I
pull data from a question asked in both 1991 and 2008 regarding a respondent’s level of
agreement with the statement that a husband’s job is to earn money while a wife’s job is to take
care of the home and family (see Appendix 1). Responses were given on a five-point scale from
strongly agree to strongly disagree. For both the same-sex and gender roles question, an option
was provided for those who “can’t choose”. For each question, I have coded these responses as
missing data. In addition, all variables are coded so that responses with lower numerical values

12

Note that question wording on abortion differs between 1991 and 2008 (See Appendix 1 for full question
wording). In 1991, respondents are asked their thoughts on whether the law should permit abortion in various
circumstances; meanwhile, in 2008, the questions hinge on one’s personal beliefs regarding abortion. Neither wave
of the ISSP survey asks respondents about their general feelings on abortion without these particular circumstances.
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indicate conservative values while higher values indicate liberal attitudes. To test the relationship
between religion and various social values, I performed both bivariate and multivariate ordered
probit analysis.

Statistical Results
Overview
The crux of my findings indicate that religion and personal religiosity operate differently
on both sides of the Irish border. In other words, my analysis of the Irish case study does not
provide universal support for any one theory set forth in the literature. In Northern Ireland,
sectarian differences between Protestants and Catholics on issues of abortion, same sex
relationships, and gender roles are apparent in the data. This finding indicates that religious
identity operates in a way most congruent with the ethnoreligious model in the North. In other
words, religious group identity matters a great deal alongside personal religiosity in Northern
Ireland. There is also support for the religiosity model in the North. Meanwhile, in the Republic
of Ireland, sectarian differences are not as apparent regarding the issues studied. Instead,
personal religiosity is the primary driver of attitudinal differences on social issues regarding
gender and sexuality. As such, there is strong evidence of the religiosity model in the Republic.
No statistical findings offer support for the countermobilization theory in the Irish context.

Northern Ireland
The trend evidenced in Northern Ireland between 1991 and 2008 indicate strong support
for the proposed ethnoreligious and religiosity models. In other words, my data analysis shows
that both religiosity and religious identity matter a great deal in Northern Ireland. In 1991 and
2008 alike, sectarian differences are clear between Protestants and Catholics in their attitudes on
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social issues, with a higher proportion of Catholics exhibiting conservative views on abortion
than Protestants (see Table 1).
It is important to contextualize these results in light of the questions asked about abortion
access. Notably, in each year, both abortion questions indexed ask the respondent about their
level of agreement with abortion access in the event of medical necessity and financial necessity
respectively (See Appendix 1). This means that more liberal scores on the abortion index
indicate more agreement with these exceptions which would allow for abortion access. More
liberal scores on the abortion index do not necessarily mean that respondents agree with more
generalized abortion access without medical or financial necessity.
The sectarian divide changes in regards to Northern Irish religious attitudes about samesex relationships. In both 1991 and 2008, bivariate ordered probit models show that Protestants
were significantly more conservative than non-Protestants in their beliefs on same-sex
relationships and gender roles in family. Bivariate models also indicate that Catholics were more
liberal than non-Catholics in 2008 regarding same-sex relationships, while no statistically
significant relationship can be found in 1991. Alternately, Catholics exhibited more liberal
beliefs than non-Catholics on gender roles in 1991, while no statistically significant relationship
emerges in the 2008 data. The bivariate models indicate that neither Catholics nor Protestants are
consistently liberal or conservative on the issues of abortion, LGBT relationships, and gender
roles.
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Table 1: Northern Ireland, Abortion Index 2008 13
Catholic

Protestant

No religion

2 (most conservative)

39.35

20.69

13.89

3

7.97

10.46

8.33

4

18.05

16.88

8.8

5

10.08

13.44

14.81

6

12.36

18.67

18.52

7

3.58

5.47

5.56

8 (most liberal)

8.62

14.39

30.09

Total

100

100

100

Sig

***

***

***

The values of each column sum to 100 after rounding. “Sig.” reports statistical significance of
bivariate ordered probit models testing the relationship between the Column variable and the
Abortion index. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

13

The trend demonstrated in this table is also evidenced in the 1991 Northern Ireland data.

33

An Emerging Ethno-religious Group: The Nones in Northern Ireland
While bivariate ordered probit models are useful in showing the general trends in belief
between those in the religious in-group and out-group, multivariate ordered probit models allow
for a more rigorous analysis. When all variables are accounted for in the model, different and
more nuanced trends emerge (see Table 2). Most notably, the multivariate model indicates that
the religiously unaffiliated population emerged as its own politically cohesive group between
1991 and 2008. Further, by 2008, the “nones” follow the same ethnoreligious pattern
demonstrated by Catholics and Protestants across all waves of Northern Ireland data.
This multivariate model is coded to compare all listed variables to the un-listed religious
identity group – Catholics. Strikingly, the “No Religion” group is not statistically significant on
any dependent variable in 1991, but was significant across all dependent variables in 2008.14
This means that the religiously unaffiliated in Northern Ireland were not yet acting as a
politically cohesive group in 1991, which changed by 2008. It follow that, by 2008, the “nones”
began to map onto the sectarian, ethno-religious pattern observable between Protestants and
Catholics in the North since the earliest waves of data collection, which supports the presence of
an ethnoreligious model as it relates to the Northern Irish case.
It is worth noting that the gendered social issues studied do not line up neatly along the
Protestant-Catholic split. While Catholics are conservative on abortion, they are liberal on samesex marriage and gender roles. At the same time, Protestants are liberal on abortion while
holding more conservative views on same-sex marriage and gender roles; however, the
unaffiliated are consistently liberal on all topics studied (see Table 2). These findings suggest

14

This is not to say that the unaffiliated population weren’t a generally liberal group in 1991. Bivariate cross
tabulations indicate religiously unaffiliated individuals were more liberal than religiously affiliated individuals
(including Protestants and Catholics) in 1991.
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that Protestants and Catholics in the North do not view the issues of abortion, same-sex marriage,
and gender roles as interconnected when forming their political opinions. I will further expand
on this dynamic in the qualitative portion of my thesis.
The Northern Ireland multivariate analysis also reveals a consistent pattern over time
regarding measures of personal religiosity and their impact on social values. Interestingly,
attendance, self-identified religiosity, and feelings about the Bible all exhibit a statistically
significant relationship with the dependent variables in Northern Ireland, with one exception. It
seems that attendance at religious services is not a good indicator of gender role attitudes, which
is evidenced by the lack of significance in Table 2 across all years. In sum, it appears there is
substantial evidence supporting the existence of both the ethno-religious and religiosity theories
in Northern Ireland.
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Table 2: Northern Ireland Multivariate Analysis15
1991

2008

Abortion Index Same-Sex Gender Roles Abortion Index Same-Sex Gender Roles
Protestant

No Religion

Attendance

Self-identified religiosity

Feelings about Bible

N

0.586***

-0.446***

-0.245**

0.375***

-0.771***

-0.121

[0.116]

[0.132]

[0.100]

[0.087]

[0.103]

[0.082]

0.208

-.412

-0.253

0.797***

0.508**

0.274*

[0.206]

[0.254]

[0.189]

[0.184]

[0.225]

[0.159]

-0.076***

-0.061**

-0.003

-0.076***

-0.114***

-0.008

[0.022]

[0.028]

[0.021]

[0.021]

[0.024]

[0.019]

-0.163***

-0.169**

-0.133**

-0.214***

-0.218***

-0.113***

[0.056]

[0.074]

[0.060]

[0.040]

[0.047]

[0.034]

-0.240***

-0.312***

-0.267***

[0.078]

[0.097]

[0.070]

652

701

751

876

860

1,030

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Ordered Probit Models with Standard Errors in Brackets.

15

Every dependent variable is coded so that higher values indicate more liberal views and lower values indicate more conservative views.
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The Republic of Ireland
Analysis of the data in the Republic of Ireland most strongly supports the religiosity
theory, wherein religiosity is the most impactful religious indicator for individual beliefs. While
bivariate models show some impact for religious denomination variables, in the more rigorous
multivariate analysis, it is the religiosity variables that are more robustly tied to views on gender
and sexuality.
In Ireland, bivariate analysis shows that Catholics are consistently more conservative than
non-Catholics on the issue of abortion in 1991 and 2008. Analysis of the 1991 wave of data
indicates that Catholics were also more conservative on issues of same sex couples and
traditional gender roles at that time. Interestingly, in 1991 bivariate analysis, Protestants were
found to be more liberal on issues of abortion than non-Protestants, yet there is no statistically
significant relationship present in 2008. Further, in 2008, Protestants were found to be more
conservative on same sex relationships when compared to those in the outgroup. Consistent to
the literature, the bivariate analysis indicates that the religiously unaffiliated were consistently
more liberal than the religiously-affiliated on all issues in 1991 and 2008 (See Table 3).
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Table 3: Ireland Abortion Index, 2008 16
Catholic

Protestant

No religion

2 (most conservative)

33.44

23.06

14.63

3

8.69

16.13

5.75

4

18.64

19.42

14.58

5

14.62

12.39

11.88

6

12.57

8.14

22.33

7

3.92

10.09

7.56

8 (most liberal)

8.1

10.78

23.27

Total

100

100

100

Sig

***

***

The values of each column sum to 100 after rounding. “Sig.” reports statistical significance of
bivariate ordered probit models testing the relationship between the Column variable and the
Abortion index. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

However, when controlling for all variables at once, it becomes clear that religious
identity operates differently on this side of the border. Unlike in Northern Ireland, the sectarian
differences between Protestants and Catholics in the Republic are not the significant driving
force of differences on abortion, LGBT relationships, and gender role attitudes. Instead,
multivariate analysis shows that measures of personal religiosity are consistently significant as it
relates to each dependent variable across all waves of data (See Table 4).

16

Similar trends are found in 1991 for Catholics and the Nones; however, there is a statistically significant
relationship in 1991 in the positive direction, indicating Protestants were more liberal than non-Protestants on
abortion attitudes in that wave of data.

38

Table 4: Ireland Multivariate Analysis17
1991

2008

Abortion Index Same-Sex Gender Roles Abortion Index Same-Sex Gender Roles
Protestant

No Religion

Attendance

Self-identified religiosity

Feelings about Bible

N

0.275

-0.319

-0.239

0.075

-0.486***

0.075

[0.199]

[0.265]

[0.212]

[0.160]

[0.242]

[0.136]

0.09

0

0.313

-0.201

-0.244

-0.193

[0.331]

[0.303]

[0.309]

[0.173]

[0.242]

[0.174]

-0.119***

-0.123***

-0.038**

-0.1***

-0.158***

-0.064***

[0.019]

[0.023]

[0.019]

[0.026]

[0.027]

[0.021]

-0.088*

-0.154**

-0.143***

-0.2***

-0.171***

-0.085

[0.046]

[0.061]

[0.046]

[0.041]

[0.051]

[0.046]

-0.278***

-0.378***

-0.392***

-0.306***

-0.262***

-0.127**

[0.061]

[0.068]

[0.058]

[0.062]

[0.067]

[0.059]

862

840

919

1,235

1,274

1,510

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Ordered Probit Models with Standard Errors in Brackets.

17

Every dependent variable is coded so that higher values indicate more liberal views and lower values indicate more conservative views.
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In the Republic, multivariate analysis indicates that personal religiosity matters more than
religious group identity in shaping attitudes about abortion, LBGTQ+ issues, and gender roles. In
other words, it doesn’t matter whether an individual identifies as Catholic, Protestant, or
religiously unaffiliated. What really matters is their personal level of religiosity. Interestingly,
though I have earlier expanded on the debate between scholars regarding measures of personal
religiosity, this multivariate model indicates that church attendance, self-rated religiosity, and
level of Biblical literalism are all consistently impactful in the context of the Republic.
Similarly to the North, bivariate analysis indicates that the unaffiliated hold significantly
more liberal opinions on social issues than the religiously affiliated. Interestingly, when models
take account of religiosity measures, the unaffiliated in the Republic do not follow the same
trend earlier evidenced in the North. The “nones” do not emerge in 2008 as a politically distinct
group, which is demonstrated by the consistent lack of statistical significance in the multivariate
model. This stark difference in trends across the Irish border supports my position that the impact
of religion on social values is unique to each national context.

Liberal Catholics in the Republic of Ireland
The lack of statistical significance in the multivariate model across time for the
unaffiliated does not contradict earlier findings that the unaffiliated are a generally liberal group.
Instead, this lack of significance likely says more about the Catholic population in the Republic.
The multivariate model compares groups listed to groups unlisted, meaning that the “No
Religion” line compares the religiously unaffiliated to the Catholic population in the Republic.
The consistent lack of significance may indicate that there are many nominally religious
Catholics in the Republic of Ireland; however, not all liberal Catholics are nominal in their
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personal religiosity. This non-effect could also indicate the presence of devout Catholics who
merely disagree with the Catholic Church’s stance on various social issues. I will further expand
on this phenomenon in the qualitative section of this project.
As for nominal Catholics, while these individuals still consider themselves to be Catholic,
their levels of personal religiosity are more similar to those reported by the religiously
unaffiliated in the Republic. Like the religiously unaffiliated, these nominal Catholics also tend
to hold liberal beliefs on abortion, LGBTQ+ relationships, and gender roles. I will expand on this
group of liberal Catholics in the qualitative section of this paper. These findings are not
inconsistent with existing literature which has documented the decline of the Catholic “Moral
Monopoly” as well as significant differences between nominal and devout Catholics in Ireland
(Buckley, 2016, p. 67, 79). Overall, though many individuals still label themselves as Catholic,
they are not distinguishable as a traditionally “conservative Catholic” when their social and
political beliefs are held up against others in Ireland.

Qualitative Evidence
When it comes to the impact of elite rhetoric on social values, Pierson and Bloomer say it
best when noting “who says what about abortion contributes to the outcomes that we will see in
law and policy” (Bloomer & Pierson, 2017, p. 174). Given the strong relationship in the
quantitative data between religion and all social values studied, I posit that “who says what”
about abortion, LGBTQ+ issues, and gender roles all matters a great deal. In this portion of my
study, I will expand on my statistical findings by analyzing various public statements published
by religious and activist groups on both sides of the Irish border. If the findings of my statistical
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models have persisted to modern day, I anticipate qualitative sources will provide evidence of
three main trends.
First, in the North, I expect to find the presence of major religiously unaffiliated groups
mobilizing around the latest social controversies regarding abortion and LGBTQ+ rights.18
Further, consistent with statistical findings, sectarian differences in elite rhetoric and framing of
social issues should be apparent in the North. Lastly, if the trends in the Republic have persisted,
I anticipate the presence of liberal Catholic groups mobilizing around today’s gendered social
issues; however, I do not expect to find evidence of these individuals mobilizing within the
Church due to their nominal religiosity and opposition to traditional Catholic teachings.
In this portion of my study, I will present multiple case studies which suggest that each
quantitative trend uncovered has persisted to modern day debates on gendered social issues;
however, it is important to note that this analysis is in no way exhaustive or fully representative
of religion and social values in Ireland today. Future research should expand on this framework
to collect a representative sample of public statements from churches and religiously unaffiliated
activist groups to perform a more structured content analysis.

Northern Ireland: Sectarian Divides
While statistical evidence shows that Northern Irish Protestants hold more liberal beliefs
than Catholics on the issue of abortion, Protestants exhibited more conservative views on samesex relationships than Catholics in 2008. This quantitative evidence demonstrates that gendered
social issues do not line up neatly down the Protestant and Catholic divide. That is, neither

18

Here, I omit analysis of elite rhetoric on gender roles due to lack of modern day qualitative material on gender
roles in law in Ireland. There have not yet been widespread modern day debates on gender roles in law on either side
of the Irish border; however, future research should closely follow these issues for changes, such as the potential
referendum on Article 41.2 of the Irish Constitution (Convention on the Constitution, 2014, Appendix D).
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Protestants nor Catholics are consistently liberal or conservative on all gendered social issues.
This quantitative trend suggests potential for differences in religious elite rhetoric, particularly
on the issues of abortion and LGBTQ+ issues. In this section, I will compare the sectarian trends
uncovered in the ISSP analysis to modern-day elite rhetoric from Protestant and Catholic leaders.

Sectarian Divides in Religious Elite Rhetoric on Abortion
In April 2020, the Catholic Bishops of Northern Ireland submitted a letter to the Northern
Ireland Legislative Assembly regarding abortion regulations that were being debated at the time.
The letter makes it clear that the Catholic leadership in Northern Ireland still stands firmly
against abortion rights. The letter states,
“ Our opposition to the new abortion Regulations brought into effect here by the
Westminster Parliament is rooted in the Catholic Church’s teaching concerning
the dignity of every human life, regardless of age, ability, gender, or background.
This teaching prohibits the direct and deliberate intention to end the life of an
unborn baby at any state of his or her development. This right to life of the child
is inextricably linked to the right to life and well-being of the mother” (Martin, et
al., 2020).
This 2020 statement suggest that the elite rhetoric on abortion by Catholic leaders in the North
still maps onto sectarian trends evidenced in the 1991-2008 ISSP data.
One major point of difference between Protestant and Catholic elite rhetoric on the issue
of abortion is the right to access abortions out of medical necessity. A 2016 article quotes Tim
Bartlett on this issue. At the time, Bartlett served as the secretary of the Catholic Council for
Social Affairs (Sherwood, 2016). Bartlett emphasized that the Catholic Church works with
“’women whose babies have life-limiting conditions’” (Sherwood, 2016). Bartlett goes on to say
that “’the child is still technically, clinically and in every sense alive as a human person, and is
entitled to have their life protected’” (Sherwood, 2016). On the other hand, Normal Hamilton, an
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affiliate of the Presbyterian Church expressed different sentiments. Though Hamilton
emphasized the Presbyterian Church’s objection to abortion as a form of birth control, he
describes the Church as being “content” with regulations which allow for abortion access when it
is medically necessary (Sherwood, 2016).
Hamilton’s statements are consistent with other statements from major Protestant
churches in the North. In 2019, the Church of Ireland submitted a “Response to Abortion
Services Framework Consultation”. In this response, the Church of Ireland details their belief
about each provision of the proposed abortion legislation (Church of Ireland, 2019). Throughout
this document, the Church reiterates their objection to “abortion on demand” (Church of Ireland,
2019, p. 1); however, the Church of Ireland directly states their belief that abortion should be
“available in cases of medical necessity” (Church of Ireland, 2019, p. 1). That is, abortion should
be available when there is “a risk to the life, or of serious harm to the health, of the pregnant
woman” (Church of Ireland, 2019, p. 2).
As I noted in the quantitative results section, the ISSP survey questions on abortion only
ask about a respondent’s level of agreement with abortion access in the event of medical and
financial necessity. This means that Protestants in the North were found to be more liberal than
Catholics in their views regarding access to abortion under these circumstances. As such, the
statements from Catholic and Protestant leaders in the North about when abortion should be
available are consistent with trends uncovered in my quantitative analysis.

Sectarian Divides in Religious Elite Rhetoric on Same-Sex Marriage
Meanwhile, analysis of the ISSP data uncovered that Northern Irish Protestants held more
conservative beliefs regarding same-sex marriage than Catholics. As noted in the policy
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overview, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has stood firmly against the legalization of
same-sex marriage. Further, the DUP has longstanding ties to the Free Presbyterian Church, as
each organization was founded by Ian Paisley Sr (Savage, 2019). As such, I look to the Free
Presbyterian Church for evidence of their religious elite rhetoric around same-sex marriage
today.19
In January 2020, the General Presbytery of the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster
published two press releases in response to the legalization of same-sex marriage in the North,
which began on January 13, 2020. In the first press release, the Church re-emphasized their
belief that “marriage is a holy institution given by God for the monogamous, lifelong, marital
union of men and women” (Dane & Greer, 2020). This first statement also issues a grave
warning to “legislators of evil” who will be called to account on Judgement Day (Dane & Greer,
2020).
The second press release, also issued in January 2020, is a statement that directly urges
politicians to prevent same-sex marriage in the Republic. In this statement, Reverends Dane and
Greer emphasize their view of Scriptural teachings on marriage. Specifically, the Reverends
argue “God’s abhorrence of same-sex sins above other sins”, as they believe the people of
Sodom were destroyed due to their engagement in same-sex relationships (Dane & Greer, 2020).
The Reverends warn that similar destruction will be forthcoming if society does not repent of
same-sex sins (Dane & Greer, 2020).
Meanwhile, the Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference also published a “Response to the
Northern Ireland Office Consultation on same-sex religious marriage” (Martin, et al., 2020).

19

The Free Presbyterian Church is a minority population within the larger Northern Irish Protestant community that
evidences an extreme sectarian view of same-sex marriage. I do not posit that this view is reflective of the entire
Protestant community. I present these statements as limited evidence of modern-day conservative views on
LGBTQ+ issues among Protestants in the North.
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Throughout this statement, the Bishops emphasize the rights and freedoms of religious
organizations and advocate for regulations which protect the rights of churches to refuse to
perform “religious same-sex marriages” if they are not comfortable doing so (Martin, et al.,
2020). While the Irish Catholic Bishop’s Conference advocates for these religious protections,
the rhetoric used is quite different from that of the Free Presbyterian Church. To quote from the
response,
“ As Pope Francis explained in his Apostolic Exhortation on ‘The Joy of Love’
(Amoris Laetitia), ‘The Church makes her own the attitude of the Lord Jesus, who
offers his boundless love to each person without exception… We would like before
all else to reaffirm that every person, regardless of sexual orientation, ought to be
respected in his or her dignity and treated with consideration, while every sign of
unjust discrimination is to be carefully avoided, particularly any form of
aggression and violence’” (Martin, et al., 2020).
Though the Free Presbyterian Church and Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference
seemingly agree that churches in Northern Ireland should not be forced to perform samesex religious marriage, there is a stark contrast in the rhetoric chosen by each group.
While the Free Presbyterian Church uses rhetoric that emphasizes sin, repentance, and
Judgement Day, the Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference opts for affirmation and
compassion for all people regardless of their sexuality. Further, the Free Presbyterian
Church calls on legislators to reverse the legalization of same-sex marriage while the
Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference only advocates for regulations which would ensure
religious institutions have a choice in performing same-sex religious marriage
ceremonies. This conflicting, sectarian rhetoric from religious elites in the North offers
limited qualitative support for my quantitative finding that Northern Irish Catholics
exhibit more liberal views on same-sex marriage than Protestants. To more definitively
assess whether the sectarian divides from 1991 and 2008 have persisted to modern day,
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future research should aggregate a more representative sample of statements from
religious elites in the North and conduct a more rigorous content analysis.

Northern Ireland: The Nones
Consistent with earlier statistical analysis, the religiously unaffiliated are still a cohesive,
influential group in Northern Ireland today. From 2013 to 2018, many atheists organized under
Atheist Northern Ireland; however, this group dissolved in 2018 (Atheist Northern Ireland). In
their final Facebook post, Atheist Northern Ireland encouraged their members to follow Northern
Ireland Humanists, as many of the group’s administrators would be taking leadership posts there.
From that time on, Northern Ireland Humanists became one the biggest and cohesive networks
for the religiously unaffiliated. Northern Ireland Humanists was officially founded in 2016,
though the group’s website notes that they have been active for decades prior (Northern Ireland
Humanists, 2021). Further, Northern Ireland Humanists is a section of Humanists UK, which
only adds to their legitimacy and cohesion.
Northern Ireland Humanists have been a part of multiple successful campaigns related to
the social values pertinent to this study. As midnight passed on October 21, 2019, the deadline to
form a Northern Irish Executive officially closed. A blog post was shared to the Northern Ireland
Humanist website late that night celebrating the simultaneous passage of provisions legalizing
same-sex marriage and decriminalized abortions (Northern Ireland Humanists, 2019). The author
of the blog post notes that Northern Ireland Humanists and Humanists UK had campaigned on
these issues for decades. The existence and growth of the unaffiliated population demonstrated
by the success and status of Northern Ireland Humanists is consistent with the trends evidenced
in the 2008 ISSP data.
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Even as the group celebrated their success in 2019, they emphasize that their work is far
from over. The October 21 blog post says,
“However, work has not finished: over the coming months we need to closely
watch the legislation to ensure that these rights promised to women and LGBT
people are delivered in full.” (Northern Ireland Humanists, 2019).
Today, abortion is still listed as a campaign platform for Northern Ireland Humanists, as they
are still active in ensuring abortions are “safe, free, and available to all (Northern Ireland
Humanists, 2021). The Northern Ireland Humanists have partnered extensively with the British
Humanist Association as well as Humanists UK to campaign for abortion rights in the North.
This advocacy has primarily taken place through litigation. Recent successes this coalition
include multiple legal wins which ensure women in Northern Ireland have access to safe and free
abortions through the National Health Service (Humanists UK, 2016). Future research should
continue to follow the growth and mobilization of the religiously unaffiliated in Northern Ireland
as they work to further liberal social causes.

A Brief Note on Nones in the Republic
Subsequent research should also track the growth of the religiously unaffiliated
population in the Republic of Ireland. The biggest unaffiliated network in the Republic is Atheist
Ireland and was founded in 2008 (Atheist Ireland, 2021). Similarly to the Northern Ireland
Humanists, Atheist Ireland has been active and successful in their efforts to liberalize access to
abortions and same sex marriage. This group has been particularly critical of Catholic rhetoric on
abortion and LGBT issues since 2008. In 2017, Atheist Ireland addressed the Citizens Assembly
as they debated issues such as abortion rights at the constitutional convention (Atheist Ireland,
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2021). Today, Atheist Ireland is working to roll back Constitutional provisions that discriminate
against non-religious individuals, reform Census questions regarding religion to better represent
the religiously unaffiliated, and repeal Ireland’s blasphemy law (Atheist Ireland, 2021).

Liberal Catholics in the Republic
After a thorough search, I was unable to find a single prominent organization specifically
founded for liberal Catholics in the Republic; however, upon second glance, this is not a
surprising result. Statistical analysis indicated that group identity was not salient in the Republic
from 1991-2008. So, the lack of modern-day cohesive political or religious group for nominal
Catholics is further indication that group identity is still not salient in the Republic today.
Instead, interviews with Irish Archbishops and other church leaders directly address the impact
of nominal Catholics – a population that is implied by earlier statistical analysis in the Republic.
In a 2018 interview the current archbishop of Armagh, Archbishop Eamon Martin,
discussed the categories of Catholics from his point of view (Sherwood, 2018). First, he
describes the modern-day devout Catholics as “a remnant” of what once was in the Republic. He
then acknowledges the magnitude of people who consider themselves to be “nominally or
culturally Catholic but who have drifted away from regular practice” (Sherwood, 2018). Lastly,
there are individuals who have entirely rejected the Church’s teachings and are openly hostile to
the religion (Sherwood, 2018). In another interview with the New York Times, Martin expands
on why he believes the Catholic church is losing influence in Ireland.20 He says,

20

Interestingly, in 2015, Martin refrained from telling Catholics how they should vote regarding the same-sex
marriage referendum. Though it was public knowledge that he intended to vote No, he was not affiliated with any
campaigns regarding the vote (McGarry, 2015). In my view, it seems that Martin is sensitive to negative opinions
about the Church and has tried to refrain from furthering such sentiments through his actions.
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“The scandals emerged at a moment which was either just the wrong time or the
right time, depending on which side you are, for them to emerge. The two things,
the change in the attitude to the church and the abuse, came together and had a
disastrous effect” (Stack, 2017).
Martin’s firsthand account regarding the causes of the Catholic Church’s downfall in the
Republic are consistent with scholarly literature on the topic (Buckley, 2016; Inglis
2017). A 2010 research report from the Irish Catholic Bishops Conference provides
additional support for the existence of nominal Catholics in the Republic. The report
notes that Catholics in the Republic pray less often, on average, than those in the North.
Additionally, fewer Catholics in the Republic report attending Mass once a week or more
compared to Catholics in Northern Ireland (O’Mahony, 2010).
Martin later expands on his beliefs regarding the number of true Catholics in
Ireland. While over three-fourths of the population in the Republic identified themselves
as Catholic in the 2011 census, “the archbishop said he believed the figure for true
believers was closer to 20 percent” (Stack, 2017). These statements from the Irish
Archbishop make complete sense when compared to the statistical findings of this piece.
Martin’s analysis of nominal Catholicism support the conclusion that no significant
difference could be found between the nones and Catholics in my multivariate analysis
because many people who are actually rather distant from the Church in practice and
belief still call themselves Catholic and respond in kind on surveys. Further, there are
those who are entirely hostile to the Church, who now likely identify as a religious
“none”, both in day-to-day life as well as when they are asked to identify on surveys.
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My search for case studies doesn’t specifically reveal liberal Catholic groups
mobilizing around abortion access in the Republic; however, prominent pro-choice
Catholic figures demonstrate that not all liberal Catholics are nominal in their personal
religiosity. For instance, the most prominent example of a practicing liberal Catholic is
former president of the Republic, Mary Robinson. Mary Robinson is an outspoken prochoice Catholic who has consistently advocated for abortion rights. Robinson’s
biography, authored by Olivia O’Leary and Helen Burke, revealed that Robinson was in
favor of abortion access in the Republic (Molloy, 1998). This move shocked many
Catholics in the Republic and beyond and spurred great pushback within the Catholic
community (Molloy, 1998).
In the biography, Robinson says, “I was very angry at a lot of what the Church
stood for at that time [the 1960’s], at how religion could become power-play and
oppressive, undermining the true sense of spirituality and the true ethical norms and
standards that are at the highest reaches of the human mind” (Molloy, 1998). Similarly, in
a 2009 interview, Robinson criticizes the Catholic Church for the religious framework
and traditions which “subjugate women” to “second class citizens” (The Elders, 2009).
Despite her sustained, public criticism of the Church, Robinson has been quite open
about her personal religiosity and Catholic identity. She says, “I’m deeply spiritual and
I’m seeking to understand the way in which so much of the Catholic Church is so
authoritarian not supporting family planning” (Irish Central, 2013). Robinson goes on to
share her belief that, “the gospel of Jesus as being the highest standard that we can attain”
(Irish Central, 2013). The way that Robinson reconciles her personal political views,
career in public service, and personal religious identity sheds light on the presence of
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devout liberal Catholics whose personal spirituality bolsters their individual political
beliefs, even when The Church decrees a different teaching.
Future research should further interrogate the presence and magnitude of liberal
Catholics, including those who are nominal in their personal religiosity as well as those
who use a spiritual lens to frame their liberal views. This context regarding the presence
of liberal Catholics in the Republic is particularly relevant as it relates to the collection of
future survey data in the country. As my study demonstrates, the presence of nominal
Catholics in the “Catholic” pool can cause confusing results without context regarding
the salience of religiosity in the Republic. Future quantitative research should consider
using religiosity indicators to group Catholics in the Republic from the outset. Parsing out
devout and nominal Catholics in this way would allow liberal Catholicism in the
Republic to be better understood and analyzed in future studies.

Discussion and Conclusion
To summarize, quantitative analysis of ISSP data reveals that religious identity and
personal religiosity are both salient in Northern Ireland. Further, over time, the religiously
unaffiliated have become their own distinct group within this ethnoreligious framework in the
North. Meanwhile, religiosity is most salient in the Republic of Ireland. The lack of distinction
between the religious nones and Catholics in the multivariate analysis suggests the presence of
nominal Catholics in the Republic who hold liberal social beliefs, breaking from the Church’s
teachings on abortion, same-sex relationships, and gender roles. Additionally, qualitative case
studies pertaining to each trend provide evidence, albeit limited, that each trend uncovered by my
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quantitative analysis has persisted in modern day debates around abortion and same-sex
marriage.

Limitations and Potential for Future Research
I hope this project meaningfully speaks to the unique ways that religion and national
context intersect to shape public opinion on issues related to gender. While I am proud of this
work which builds on larger bodies of research related to the intersection of gender, politics, and
religion, there are limitations to this piece that should inform future research endeavors. Some of
these limitations are due, in part, by the COVID-19 pandemic which limited my ability to
incorporate interviews into my research design and impacted the structure of my qualitative
analysis.21
First, Northern Ireland was not included in the 2018 ISSP Religion survey, which limited
my ability to track quantitative trends to modern day. Future research could apply my
quantitative methods to 2018 ISSP religion data from Ireland to determine if and how the trends
evidenced here have changed in the decade since 2008. I would also like to see future research
build gender, race, sexuality, and class identities into the multivariate model to construct a more
intersectional analysis. As Ireland continues to diversify both racially and religiously, the
intersections of these identities will become an even more pressing topic of study. Specifically,
future research should interrogate the ways that the intersection of race, religion, and gender
might matter differently for men and women.

21

More generally, the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly changed the face of research today. For instance, this
entire thesis project was conducted during COVID-times, which necessitated fully virtual meetings with my advisor,
research methods that could be conducted remotely, and a hybrid defense format.
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I also believe the qualitative portion of this project leaves ample opportunity for growth
in future research. Here, I have provided limited case studies pertaining to each trend evidenced
in my statistical analysis. Moving forward, a representative sample of elite rhetoric from multiple
traditions could be studied through a more rigorous and systematized content analysis. I find it
interesting that, when conducting the qualitative analysis, I struggled to find sources related to
gender roles in family. Most public statements from religious and political leaders are specific to
more contentious issues that can be directly legislated. I believe that interviews could bridge the
gap between the quantitative findings about gender roles and the lack of qualitative material on
the topic on both sides of the border. In addition, my research points to multiple groups which
are seemingly understudied in the Irish context, such as liberal Catholics in the Republic and the
religiously unaffiliated. Because these groups often mobilize outside of religious settings,
interviews could also prove useful in better understanding these communities in future studies.
After finishing this project, I am also left curious about the disconnect between everyday
religious folks and religious elites as it relates to social issues. Future research should expand on
both the substance of these divisions and the reasons behind such divides. I believe interviews
with everyday individuals and religious elites could prove valuable in uncovering the disconnect
on various gendered church teachings. Throughout the qualitative portion of this piece, I found
records of interviews with religious elites to be particularly helpful in understanding the divide
between elite rhetoric and the political mobilization of everyday people, which often contradicts
church teaching. For these reasons, I encourage future researchers to pursue interviews on these
topics when in-person research methods are more able to comfortably and safely resume.
Now that progress has been made on abortion and same-sex marriage on both sides of the
border, future researcher must consider which social issues will be most salient moving forward
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and how these issues should be studied. In my view, researchers should keep an eye on
transgender and gender-inclusive movements on both sides of the border, as issues relevant to
these communities have been absent from the more widespread push for same-sex marriage.
Public opinion survey organizations, such as ISSP, should begin to consider how attitudes on
these issues could be measured in upcoming surveys. Specific to the Irish context, researchers
should also keep an eye on the potential upcoming referendum to amend constitutional language
on gender roles in the Republic. If this referendum were to occur, more qualitative material from
religious elites on gender roles would likely surface.
More generally, this project demonstrates that religion impacts public opinion in unique
ways depending on the national context. I hope that this finding informs future research
regarding possible theories of religious impact. The findings of my project indicate that there is
likely not one correct answer when it comes to theorizing the impact of religion on public
opinion. I believe that the findings of this study could translate to broader conversations
surrounding religion and social values, such as the liberalization of abortion policy in Argentina
or the continued disputes about religious exemptions for same-sex unions in the United States.
Additionally, my work has identified the religiously unaffiliated as an important player in the
Irish political arena. In my view, this is an understudied topic in the Irish context and ripe for
future research. Future work should track the growth of the religiously unaffiliated and their
political salience in future debates of social importance on both sides of the border.
As I wrap up this project, I look back on the lived experiences that first motivated my
interest in gender, sexuality, and religion. I realize now that, despite my own devout religious
background, I have viewed the role of religion in shaping gendered social values with a lot of
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contempt. I have seen firsthand the hurt that can be caused when socially conservative, religious
values are forced on others.
In light of these personal experiences and frustrations, the story of social progress on both
sides of the Irish border has been inspiring to study. Moving forward, more people will have to
reconcile the role of religion in society and politics, especially as many societies undergo social
progress. In my view, those of us who firmly believe in equal rights and social progress have two
choices. We can leave the Church and join the rapidly growing community of the religiously
unaffiliated. Alternatively, we can stay within our religious communities and help create spaces
where progressive social values and religious beliefs are not at fundamental odds. As for me, I
haven’t yet decided which path I will choose; however, I am thankful and proud to have
undertaken a project that leaves me with more questions to explore as I move on from my time at
the University of Louisville.
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APPENDIX 1
2008 QUESTIONNAIRE
Dependent Variable Questions
Same sex relationships
And what about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex, is it…
•
•
•
•
•

Always wrong (1)
Almost always wrong (2)
Wrong only sometimes (3)
Not wrong at all (4)
Can’t choose (8)

Abortion
Do you personally think it is wrong or not wrong for a woman to have an abortion?
a). If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?
b). If the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children
•
•
•
•
•

Always wrong
Almost always wrong
Wrong only sometimes
Not wrong at all
Can’t choose

Gender Roles
Do you agree or disagree…
A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after the home and family.
•
•
•
•
•
•

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Can’t choose
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Independent Variable Questions
Feelings about the Bible
Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?
•
•
•
•
•

The Bible is the actual word of God and it is to be taken literally, word for word
The Bible is the inspired word of God, but not everything should be taken literally, word
for word
The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by
man
This does not apply to me
Can’t choose

Religious attendance
28. How often do you take part in the activities or organizations of
a church or place of worship other than attending services?
Never
Less than once a year.
About once or twice a year
Several times a year
About once a month
2-3 times a month
Nearly every week
Every week
Several times a week
Self-Reported Religiosity
Would you describe yourself as…
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely religious
Very religious
Somewhat religious
Neither religious nor non-religious
Somewhat non-religious
Very non-religious
Extremely non-religious
Can’t choose
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APPENDIX 1 (cont.)
1991 QUESTIONNAIRE
Dependent Variable Questions
Same sex relationships
And what about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex, is it…
• Always wrong
• Almost always wrong
• Wrong only sometimes
• Not wrong at all
• Can’t choose
Abortion
Do you think the law should or should not allow a woman to obtain a legal abortion…
a). If there is a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby?
b). If the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children?
•
•
•
•
•

Definitely should allow it
Probably should allow it
Probably should not allow it
Definitely should not allow it
Can’t choose

Independent Variable Questions
Feelings about the Bible
Which one of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?
•
•
•
•
•

The Bible is the actual word of God and it is to be taken literally, word for word
The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything should be taken literally, word
for word
The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral teachings recorded by
man
This does not apply to me
Can’t choose
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Religious Attendance
Now, thinking about the present, how often do you attend religious services?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Never
Less than once a year
About once or twice a year
Several times a year
About once a month
2-3 times a month
Nearly every week
Every week
Several times a week

Self-Reported Religiosity
Would you describe yourself as…
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely religious
Very religious
Somewhat religious
Neither religious nor non-religious
Somewhat non-religious
Very non-religious
Extremely non-religious
Can’t choose
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